Leveraging program slicing to understand network traffic by Stewart, Allen Joel






























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science in the 












COPYRIGHT © 2019 BY ALLEN JOEL STEWART  
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Materials And Research @ Georgia Tech


























Dr. Saltaformaggio, Advisor 
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Beyah 
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Smith 
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering 








I would like to express my deepest thanks to both the CyFI lab and GTRI-CIPHER 
for all of the support I received in pursuit of my Master’s Degree and Thesis. Without the 
leadership and encouragement made available to me, this journey would not have been the 
same. 
Dr. Saltaformaggio, thank you for affording me the opportunity to work for you in 
the CyFI lab while striving for my degree. You have done an amazing job in building a 
group of students that are both brilliant and eager to help. I appreciate the opportunity to 
learn from you and your team. You have pushed me to achieve things I did not believe I 
was capable of. I am forever grateful for this. 
Mr. Roberts, thank you for the opportunity to work for you at GTRI while pursuing 
my graduate degree. It was there that found my passion for cyber security, and the 
trajectory of my career forever altered. I appreciate the guidance you have offered me, both 
academically and professionally. I look forward to the opportunity to continue learning and 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF FIGURES vi 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS vii 
SUMMARY viii 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction and Background 1 
1.1 Backward Slice 2 
1.1.1 What is a Backward Slice 2 
1.1.2 When are Backward Slices Useful 2 
1.1.3 Example 3 
1.1.4 Automation 14 
1.2 Tools Used 15 
1.2.1 Python 15 
1.2.2 Docker 16 
1.3 Literature Review 17 
1.3.1 Dispatcher 17 
1.3.2 Rosetta 17 
1.3.3 Prospex 18 
1.3.4 State of the art of network protocol reverse engineering tools 18 
1.3.5 Extracting output formats from executables 18 
1.3.6 Automatic Protocol Format Reverse Engineering through Context-Aware 
Monitored Execution 19 
1.4 Protocol Inference 20 
1.5 Spoofing Network Calls 21 
CHAPTER 2. Problem Formulation 22 
2.1 Goals 23 
2.2 Validation 24 
CHAPTER 3. Execution 25 
3.1 Functions to Support Backward Slice Graph Output 26 
3.1.1 DataModel.py 26 
3.1.2 gt_driver.py 26 
3.1.3 cdgGraph.py 26 
3.1.4 ddgGraph.py 26 
3.1.5 BackwardSlice.py 27 
3.1.6 BSPathGraph.py 27 
3.2 Additional Tools Developed 28 
3.2.1 FunctionCFG.py 28 
3.2.2 PathInfo.py 28 
3.2.3 SubPath.py 28 
3.2.4 SSValidate.py 28 
CHAPTER 4. Results 29 
4.1 Validation 30 
4.2 Implementation 41 
4.2.1 Integration Into Malware Analysis Workflow 41 
4.3 Challenges 42 
4.3.1 All Instructions That Modify Buffer Must Be Targets 42 
4.3.2 Types of Node 42 
4.3.3 Visually Confusing Nodes and Edges 42 
4.3.4 CFG Optimization Level Issue 43 
CHAPTER 5. Conclusion and future work 44 
APPENDIX A. Development environment setup 46 
APPENDIX B. Dockerize and Integration 47 
B.1 Dockerization 48 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 - Simple Example Source Code. 3 
Figure 2 - Simple Example Object Dump. 4 
Figure 3 – Simple Example Nodes. 5 
Figure 4 – Simple Example Control and Data Dependency Graph. 6 
Figure 5 – Simple Example Slice at 2.1. 7 
Figure 6 – Simple Example Slice at 4.1. 7 
Figure 7 – Simple Example Slice at 4.1 Nodes. 8 
Figure 8 - Simple Example Basic Block Nodes Member Addresses. 9 
Figure 9 – Simple Example Addresses in the Backward Slice Brought in by 0x400752. 10 
Figure 10 – Simple Example Addresses in the Backward Slice Brought in by 0x40074a. 10 
Figure 11 – Simple Example Addresses in the Backward Slice Brought in by 0x40073e. 11 
Figure 12 – Simple Example Addresses in the Backward slice Brought in by All Three Targets. 11 
Figure 13 – Simple Example Backward Slice Hand Made Path Graph. 12 
Figure 14 – Simple Example Backward Slice Hand Made Path Graph Past Read. 13 
Figure 15 – Example Source Code. 30 
Figure 16 – Example Object Dump. 31 
Figure 17 – Example Source Control Dependency Graph. 32 
Figure 18 – Example Source Data Dependency Graph. 32 
Figure 19 – Example Source Program Dependency Graph. 33 
Figure 20 - Backward Slice Path 1. 34 
Figure 21 - Backward Slice Path 2. 34 
Figure 22 - Backward Slice Path 1 Details. 35 
Figure 23 - Backward Slice Path 2 Details. 36 
Figure 24 - Automated Backward Slice Graph Path 1. 39 
Figure 25 - Automated Backward Slice Graph Path 2. 40 
Figure 26 - CFG Optimization Level Issue. 43 
 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
angr The angr Python binary analysis framework 
VM Virtual Machine 
CFG Control Flow Graph 
CDG Control Dependency Graph 
DDG 
PDG 
Data Dependency Graph 
PROGRAM DEPENDENCY GRAPH 
BS Backward Slice 
repo A GitHub repository 
CyFI The Cyber Forensics Innovation Laboratory 
GTRI The Georgia Tech Research Institute 
CIPHER GTRI Cybersecurity, Information Protection, and Hardware Evaluation Research 
NVD The Network Vulnerability Division in GTRI-CIPHER 
CLI 
 






The goal of this project is to demonstrate how program slicing, specifically 
backward slice analysis, of binaries can be utilized to characterize the behavior of 
malicious software. This is accomplished, in part, by developing a modular toolkit that 
takes a binary as input and performs a backward slice on specific statements of interest. 
Specifically, these tools enable an analyst to review the contents of a function call. These 
tools are both modular and adaptable to flex into as many roles and functions as possible. 
This ethos is central to the utility of this project. Every component stands on its own to 
allow analysts to perform targeted analyses for specific cases. The tools are designed such 
that they do not constrain an analyst, but rather ease the reverse engineering burden upon 
them. When fully integrated, the tools developed for this project enable an analyst to focus 
their reverse engineering efforts more efficiently by clearly articulating the areas of the 
binary that are of the greatest interest. 
A major motivation for the tools that are developed for this project is to be able to 
reconstruct the contents of a package that is sent by a malicious piece of software. This is 
useful for the following two reasons: identifying what information a bad actor has stolen 
from a system, and characterizing the type of data a bad actor expects to see. The latter is 
of value when spoofing malicious traffic. This project argues that analysis by way of 
program slicing, specifically backward slicing, is specifically suited for these tasks. This is 
accomplished by thoroughly explaining the concepts surrounding backward slice 
techniques, developing tools to perform analysis using backward slice analysis, 
demonstrate correctness and utility of such tools, and integrate parts of the tools into 
external analysis systems for other analysts to utilize. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This project centers around utilizing the concept of backward slice analysis of a 
binary to reconstruct the contents of a function call towards function signature, arguments, 
and return type identification. To that end, a set of tools is developed to enable an analyst 
to glean relevant information about what data a binary is accessing and what the binary is 
doing with the data it accesses. Each tool plays a small role in this overarching goal while 
also being capable of standing on its own. Robust backward slice analysis functionality has 
utility in a variety of applications including detection of unauthorized gathering of personal 
information, malicious use of private functions, and unknown network protocol analysis. 
These use cases will be discussed in the paper.  
This project aims to enable analysts to better characterize the behavior of malicious 
software through the lenses of backward slice analysis. The tools developed toward this 
end will explore and expand upon the current research employing backward slices. A 
functional integration of the tools developed and discussed in this project into a malware 
analysis workflow enable an analyst to more readily utilize backward slice analysis to 
better focus their efforts by pointing out the addresses of interest in a binary. This section 
details the information that can be gleaned from backward slice analysis and demonstrates 




1.1 Backward Slice  
Backward slice analysis, being central to the ideas presented herein, this section 
serves as an introduction to the concepts surrounding the backward slice. Beginning first 
with a detailed explanation of what a backward slice is. Followed by real world applications 
where backward slice analysis aids in reverse engineering efforts. Ending with a simple 
example that demonstrates how a backward slice is computer by hand. A solid grasp of 
these ideas is necessary to understand the work discussed throughout this paper. 
1.1.1 What is a Backward Slice 
A backward slice is a type of program slice that is used as a means by which to 
determine the statements involved in the computation of a variable at a particular address. 
It is a “backwards traversal of the program dependency graph” [1]. The program 
dependency graph is a combination of both the data dependency graph and control 
dependency graph. See Figure 4 – Simple Example Control and Data Dependency Graph 
for an example of a PDG.  
1.1.2 When are Backward Slices Useful 
Backward slice analysis is beneficial in applications where an analyst is interested 
in the origin of the definition of some variable in a program. Backward slices allow an 
analyst to see what data and instructions are influential in the state of a program at a given 
target. A target is the program address where backward slice is to begin computation. This 
type of information can be useful in reconstructing the contents of a network call, the data 
being written to a file, interactions between a peripheral and a device driver, and many 
other normal computing functions that could be exploited by malicious programs. By 
reconstructing this data in an easy-to-digest format, such as in a backward slice, the tools 
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developed for this project will enable analysts to more easily and quickly investigate for 
misbehaviour in these kinds of applications. 
1.1.3 Example 
This section shows an example of a backward slice using the simple example C 
source code shown in Figure 1 – Simple Example Source Code. It demonstrates how a 
backward slice is computed and what information the slice conveys. As a note, the code is 
compiled with GCC and run on the Intel based Ubuntu machine described in APPENDIX 
A. Development environment setup. 
 




Before beginning any analysis, it is useful to take a look at the object dump of the 
compiled code which can be seen below in Figure 2. This figure shows the instructions 
associated with the source code and allows for a more detailed look at what instructions 
are actually being executed. 
 
 






The first step in computing the backward slice is to generate the program 
dependency graph. To achieve this, the program is to split into a set of nodes that represent 
the program statements as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 – Simple Example Nodes. 
Next, both the data dependence and control dependence must be computed as 
shown in Figure 4Figure 4 – Simple Example Control and Data Dependency Graph. The 
data dependency is computed using the following two rules: X is found to be data 
dependent on Y if a variable is defined at Y and is used at X, and a path exists from Y to 
X where the variable is not redefined. Similarly, control dependence is determined using 
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the following two rules: X is found to be control dependent on Y if X is not strictly post-
dominated by Y and a path exists between X and Y where every node in the path (other 
than X and Y) is post-dominated by Y [1]. Y post-dominates X if all possible paths from 
X to program exit must go through Y. In other words, if a path exists from X to exit that 
does not include Y, Y does not post-dominate X. 
 
Figure 4 – Simple Example Control and Data Dependency Graph. 
Given this newly formed graph, a slice can now be computed. Given the target of a 
backward slice, a slice is computed by navigating the PGD through the backwards 
reachable nodes beginning at the target [1]. See the examples below in Figure 5 and Figure 




Figure 5 – Simple Example Slice at 2.1. 
 
Figure 6 – Simple Example Slice at 4.1. 
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For all of the examples to follow, the slice being investigated is for block 4 line 1. 
 
Figure 7 – Simple Example Slice at 4.1 Nodes. 
The block addresses are: 0x4006af which refers to block 1, 0x400732 which refers 
to block 2, 0x40073a which refers to block 3, and finally 0x400741 which refers to block 





Figure 8 - Simple Example Basic Block Nodes Member Addresses. 
The next step is to explore what instructions should be the targets of the backward 
slice analysis. In other words, what are the instructions that we are interested in. For this 
binary we are interested in the contents of the buffer when it is written. This being the case, 
the target instructions are chosen to be the following: 0x400752 ([write (1, buf, 1);]), 
0x40074a (pointer to the buffer), and 0x40073e ([buf[0] = true;]). Graphics indicating what 
addresses were brought into the slice by the selected targets can be seen below in Figure 9, 




Figure 9 – Simple Example Addresses in the Backward Slice Brought in by 
0x400752. 
 





Figure 11 – Simple Example Addresses in the Backward Slice Brought in by 
0x40073e. 
 




The backward slice graph shown in Figure 13 shows the addresses in the slice, what 
target address brought them into the slice, and how they were brought in, weather that be 
through data dependence or control dependence. The backward slice only includes 
addresses that are in the path. However, if the condition at 0x400736 is met, then a pre-
defined value is moved to eax (0x73a) for eventual movement into the buffer (0x40073e). 
 
Figure 13 – Simple Example Backward Slice Hand Made Path Graph. 
As shown above, there are three different ways to get to the buffer targets. These 
different ways to get through to the target are called path. For this example path 1 is 0x738 
> 0x73a > target, path 2 is 0x738 > 0x741 > target, and path 3 is 0x738 > 0x73a > 0x741 
> target . Different paths mean, potentially, different buffer contents. This being the case, 
it is necessary to find the information contained in the buffer for all paths to get a holistic 
view of what the binary can do to build the buffer contents. 
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The next step is to continue the backward slice past the call to read. As shown in 
Figure 14Figure 14 – Simple Example Backward Slice Hand Made Path Graph Past Read, 
the value of ‘true’ is set to “T” at 0x400718 highlighted In yellow. This representation of 
the backward slice identified dependencies for the target addresses provided. 
 
Figure 14 – Simple Example Backward Slice Hand Made Path Graph Past Read. 
Based on this backward slice graph, we can see the 0x40073e target performs a 
memory write to the buffer. Without this target, the initialization of true = ‘T’, which is 
stored in the buffer, is missed. 
These examples demonstrate a backward slice being computed statically. It is 
important to note that angr supports both static and dynamic analysis and that some of the 
built in functions may utilize this [3]. Additionally, this set of examples thoroughly 




As demonstrated above, the process of generating useful and complete backward 
slice graphs is highly involved even for simple binary examples. The ability to automate 
the process of constructing these graphs is central to the utility of this project. With the 
detailed backward slice information presented in a graph as shown in Figure 14, an analyst 
is capable of more easily and quickly identifying what parts of a binary should be 
investigated to characterize malicious behaviour. For example, if an analyst is reversing a 
malware sample that is suspected of sending personal information of the user to an attacker, 
these tools are capable of demonstrating where that personal information is being collected 
by the binary given the address of a network call. The automation of the backward slice 
graph reduces the burden of this portion of the analysis while also standardizing the output 
to allow for more streamlined backward slice examination. The blocks that are not 
represented in the backward slice are definitionally not a factor in the construction of the 









1.2 Tools Used 
A variety of tools are employed in development and deployment of this project. 
This section serves as a summary of the tools utilized: 
1.2.1 Python 
Python is an open source programming language that is designed around the ethos 
of enabling developers to “work quickly and integrate systems more effectively” by 
simplifying the process of working with external tools [2]. This project extensively uses 
Python and many of the packages developed for it. This section serves as a summary of the 
tools utilized. 
1.2.1.1 angr 
Angr is a framework, written in Python, that can be used to analyze binaries [3]. “It 
combines both static and dynamic symbolic ("concolic") analysis, making it applicable to 
a variety of tasks” [3]. Angr supports the following functionality out of the box [3]: 
• Control Flow Graph Recovery 
• Symbolic Execution 
• Automatic ROP Chain Building 
• Automatic Binary Hardening 
• Automatic Exploit Generations 
• GUI Based Analysis 
Because angr is so full featured and in active development it is chosen as the back 




NetworkX is a package written for Python to allow for the manipulation, creation, 
and study of networks [4]. NetworkX support the following features natively [4]: 
• Data structures that support graphs, digraphs, and multigraphs 
• Multiple standard graph algorithms 
• Analysis of network structures 
• Graph auto generation  
• Supports nodes of any type 
• Supports a multitude of edge characteristics 
NetworkX is used in this project to represent the interactions between basic block 
nodes with “dot” graphs which are a text based way to represent graph nodes and edges. 
1.2.1.3 PyGraphviz 
PyGraphviz is a framework that allows Python to interface with the Graphviz 
visualization package [5]. It allows for the creation, reading, writing, editing, and drawing 
of graphs from within Python [5]. 
1.2.2 Docker 
Docker is an instrumental tool in this project. It is one of the means by which the 
tools are packaged for other users to take advantage of. The tools are built into a docker 
container to allow for easy sharing of functionality. The docker documentation describes a 
container as “a standard unit of software that packages up code and all its dependencies so 
the application runs quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another [6].” 
The simplicity and functionality that docker provides makes it an easy choice as a means 
to distribute the tools developed for this project. 
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1.3 Literature Review 
Several papers and journal entries are consulted in the process of this research. 
These resources serve as inspiration as to what types of analyses are being conducted that 
backward slices could offer aid to. Additionally, some of these resources act as inspiration 
of the capabilities that are already enabled through backward slice analysis techniques. 
This section serves as a summary of this literature.  
1.3.1 Dispatcher 
 
Dispatcher is a paper that focuses on the importance of automated protocol 
reverse engineering techniques when it comes to cyber security related applications [7]. It 
combines techniques of multiple previous works to create a rich field analysis system that 
handles automatic encryption and touts robust message tracing [7]. The example of a 
botnet command and control protocol is used to demonstrate the necessity of an 
automated system to decipher protocols [7]. The authors employ backward traversal of 
the execution trace to deconstruct the buffer and to compute the dependency chain that 
leads to a particular instruction [7]. Both of these tasks demonstrate the utility of a robust 
set of backward slice analysis tools.  
1.3.2 Rosetta 
 
Rosetta is a study that focuses on using binary analysis to enable researchers to 
perform NAT rewriting and protocol replay [8]. The researchers work to gain a deep 
understanding of fields in network protocols, specifically dynamic fields [8]. This paper 
aims to solve the problem of “dynamic fields, e.g., hostnames, IP addresses, session 
identifiers or timestamps” needing to be modified to successfully spoof a network 
protocol [8]. The researchers demonstrate in this paper that they are able to identify a 
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variety of dynamic fields and modify the values contained in them even under 
circumstances where complex encoding is utilized [8]. 
1.3.3 Prospex  
This work is a continuation of the work done for Rosetta [9]. The authors of this 
paper aims to enhance the results obtained in protocol inference while also reducing the 
need to humans to be in the loop [9]. The claim to fame of this research is the enhanced 
ability to “automatically inferring state Machines [9].” 
1.3.4 State of the art of network protocol reverse engineering tools 
This paper “presents a survey of protocol reverse engineering tools developed in 
the last decade” and “considers tools focusing on the inference of the format of individual 
messages or of the grammar of sequences of messages [10].” The researchers aimed to 
classify the explored tools in a way that could reveal how the tools compared in an 
empirical way [10]. This background research is instrumental to understanding how 
backward slice analysis can be best applied to further research. 
1.3.5 Extracting output formats from executables 
This research paper describes the development and capabilities of tools that 
“extracts output data formats, such as file formats and network packet formats” from a 
binary that is stripped of its debug symbols in an automated manner [11]. This is 
accomplished by the use of “Value-Set Analysis (VSA) and Aggregate Structure 
Identification (ASI) to annotate HFSMs” in a way that characterizes the output values of 
the data contained in the communications [11]. Observing the approaches taken in this 
paper greatly influenced the procedures employed throughout the generation of our 
backward slice analysis tools. 
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1.3.6 Automatic Protocol Format Reverse Engineering through Context-Aware 
Monitored Execution  
This paper is a derivative work of Rosetta. The researchers demonstrate the ability 
to detect techniques used by encryption in binary files in an automated fashion [12]. The 
researched posit that existing automatic protocol reverse engineering tools are hampered 
in their ability to properly extract protocol fields because they are missing program 
semantics in the traces of the networks [12]. The techniques employed and the approaches 
taken in this paper served as yet another source of inspiration as to why better and more 
comprehensive backward slice tools is a necessity.  
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1.4 Protocol Inference 
Communication over networks using standardized and open source network 
protocols (Ex. HTTP, FTP, and SMTP) is commonplace for computer programs [13]. 
Communications that utilize these open source network protocols can be trusted because 
they are well understood and therefore easy to validate. However, malicious programs, 
such as viruses and malware, frequently use proprietary network protocols to hide their 
communications from the user. These protocols are generally much more complex and 
employ obfuscation techniques to hide the contents of their communication. Amplifying 
their complexity, malicious programs can be packaged in such a way that static reverse 
engineering by a human analyst is unreasonable. 
Taking inspiration from Dispatcher, the backward slice tools developed for this 
project have applications in the inference of information about the network protocol that 
an unknown or obfuscated binary is employing [3]. This type of analysis can be split, 
primarily, into two distinct categories. Firstly, network-based approaches evaluate sample 
packets collected from the network communication of the binary. Secondly, application-
based approaches analyze the program code of the binary. Both approaches try to generate 
a comprehensive picture of the protocol used [3]. The description of the employed protocol 
includes the following: 
• State of Client Machine – Developing a model of the state of the client 
machine when the network call is made and determining how the sending or 
receiving of packets can manipulate this state. 
• Encryption – Determining whether the packets sent over the network are 
encrypted or obfuscated in any way. 
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• Message Types – The packet types that are sent over the network. 
• Message Fields – What variety of fields are encoded in each packet. For 
example, what are the data types, what are the lengths, how are they 
generated. 
By taking inspiration from the work done in Dispatcher, this project aims to deploy 
a modular set of backward slice tools to more transparently communicate the operations of 
a binary to the analyst. This information enables an analyst to better understand what 
information a malicious piece of software is attempting to utilize. This empowers 
researchers to better combat bad actors in this space. 
1.5 Spoofing Network Calls 
Another possible application for these tools is to enable analysts to more efficiently 
spoof network calls. Using many of the same ideas as in “automated protocol inference” 
these tools can be used to collect information about the type and content of data being sent 
over the network. The collected data could be analyzed to classify what makes up a 
legitimate network call from the binary in question. Finally, this information can be used 





CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
This project aims to solve the issue of utilizing backward slice techniques to gather 
specific and detailed information about the activities of malicious binaries such as malware. 
The tools are designed to be modular to allow flexibility on how they are utilized. They are 
functional as a stand-alone analysis system as well as capable of being embedded in larger 
analysis suits. As stated above, the ideal application of these tools will enable an analyst to 
more quickly and easily employ backwards slice analysis to glean actionable information 
about the portions of a malicious binary that are responsible for a suspicious network call. 
Given that some information is known about the network call in question, these tools 






The overarching goal of this project is to develop analysis tools that enable an 
analyst to glean useful information from the backward slice of a given binary file. 
Specifically, this paper will need to demonstrate that the tools developed are capable of 
assisting an analyst in investigating how malicious binaries construct calls. This can be 
applied to a variety of calls, including network calls. 
This project makes extensive use of angr because of the vast capabilities it has and 
relatively low barrier to entry. However, because the backward slice analysis built into angr 
is not fool proof, this project aims to build upon it and make it more user friendly. The built 
in angr backward slice analysis suffers from an inability to clearly articulate significant 
information about a binary to an analyst. This project aims to rectify this to clearly and 
concisely display information about the backward slice to an analyst visually while also 
providing them with all of the raw information necessary to reconstruct the backward slice 






The tools developed are validated on example binaries that are written to clearly 
demonstrate and validate the effectiveness in investigating how the data in a function call 
is built. This approach allows for more rapid prototyping during the development of the 
aforementioned tools by drastically simplifying the source binary while also 
demonstrating its effectiveness in applicable problem sets. Additionally, this validation 








CHAPTER 3. EXECUTION 
To achieve the goals stated above, several moving pieces had to come together. 
This section serves as a list of the individual analysis tools developed in support of this 
research project. This will simply be an explanation of the tool and what role it plays in the 
overarching goal of making backward slice analysis more approachable and easier to 
integrate into more malware reverse engineering projects such as network traffic 
investigations. Any of the following tools are capable of being deployed in a stand-alone 
application, but a fully featured application of these tools makes use of them in their 
entirety. Such an application empowers analysts to focus more time on the important and 
challenging problems and less time investigating inconsequential components of the 




3.1 Functions to Support Backward Slice Graph Output 
 
3.1.1 DataModel.py 
This class houses all of the data and file manipulations utilized throughout this 
project. For the final implementation of the backward slice graph output this only includes 
code to read in information from a json file that is provided by a sponsor in the engine. 
However, for other analyses and ongoing work this houses many other functions including, 
but not limited to, processing the raw backward slice into a json file, fetching the Vex ID 
of the instructions of a backward slice, handling the errors in a prototyped out of path 
calculator, output to json for the engine, and file IO manipulations. 
3.1.2 gt_driver.py 
This class is the interface that an analyst uses to interact with the tools in a holistic 
manner. It defines the command line arguments, generates the angr project, and makes calls 
to each of the other tools that are necessary to run the analysis in its entirety. 
3.1.3 cdgGraph.py 
This class flattens the CDG into a usable format. The CDG generated by angr is 
stored in a manner that in non-conducive to working with the backward slice. More details 
about this can be found in Challenges under Types of Node. 
3.1.4 ddgGraph.py 
This class flattens the DDG into a usable format. The DDG generated by angr is 
stored in a manner that in non-conducive to working with the backward slice. More details 





This class houses all of the functionality to compute the backward slice using angr. 
It includes the following: the ability to determine what instructions are in the path and what 
instructions are out of the path, compute all of the addresses in the path, all of the addresses 
that contain the chosen statements (individual vex statements marked as part of the 
backward slice), find the statement IDs for each address (must go through all the statements 
in the block and find the IDs that correspond to the address target address), compute the 
CFG and DDG, and finally compute the nodes and runs in the slice. 
3.1.6 BSPathGraph.py 
This class handles all of the processing and analysis to produce the image outputs 
of the backward slice graph analysis. It produces a graph that contains all of the targets for 
each path. Additionally, it outputs all of the information necessary to properly debug or 
hand verify each of the outputs. This debug information includes the following: DDG and 
CDG graphs in images and dot files of the entire binary, a list of the addresses in the path, 
a list of the addresses in the slice, a list of the addresses in the slice but not in the path, and 




3.2 Additional Tools Developed 
In addition to the backward slice graph output, other tools were developed 
alongside this project to support other functionality This section serves as a summary of 
those tools. 
3.2.1 FunctionCFG.py 
This class is for analysis using CFG generated by angr. It is used for analysis on 
the function map of the binary. 
3.2.2 PathInfo.py 
This class is used to get information about a particular path. It enables an analyst to 
print path information in hex, print that same information in decimal, get the calls made in 
each path, and get function names from a particular address. 
3.2.3 SubPath.py 
This class is used to find the paths between two given nodes or creates a graph of 
all paths between two given nodes. 
3.2.4 SSValidate.py 
This class is used to validate if a feasible path exists between a given source and 






CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
The overarching results of this project is a combination of all of small tools developed 
into one finished tool that constructs a visual backward slice path graph. This graph 
represents the results of multiple different analysis of a binary. Some of these analyses is 
built into angr (such as computing the CFG), but most are built specifically for this project. 
This section details the results achieved. This approach demonstrates the ideas behind 
each step in detail while also showcasing the ability of these tools to be utilized to glean 
useful information about what malicious binaries are doing. Additionally, this section 
details the ideal insulation and application of these tools. Finally, this section serves as a 
landing place for the challenges faced throughout the development of these tools. It details 




This section serves as a walkthrough of the validation process using the example 
code. A small c program, shown in Figure 15, is written to validate these tools. In short, 
this program contains a read and a write where the contents of the write are dependent on 
the contents of the read. This section uses the unique combination of these attributes to 
thoroughly explore the backward slicing and show what useful information can be gleaned 
from it using the tools developed for this project.  
 
Figure 15 – Example Source Code. 
Again, the purpose of this example binary is to make an interesting test case for a backward 




To begin, some analysis is done by hand. The first thing to do is take a look at the 
compiled code. A clean way to do this is with an object dump. The relevant section of the 
object dump of this code can be seen below in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 – Example Object Dump. 
Armed with this information, the dependency graphs can be built. Beginning with the 
control dependency graph shown in Figure 17, then the data dependency graph shown in 
Figure 18, and finally the combination of them, of the program dependency graph shown 




Figure 17 – Example Source Control Dependency Graph. 
 





Figure 19 – Example Source Program Dependency Graph. 
 The PDG will be used to compute the backward slice. Angr defines a backward 
slice as follows: The slice of v at statement s is a set of statements used in computing v at 
s [3]. Unless otherwise stated, all of the following examples are for a backwards slice at 
5.1. Figure 20 below describes the slice of buf at statement 5.1 is a set of statements used 
in computing buf at 5.1. This is path specific: buf[0] = ‘y’. As a note, the statements 




Figure 20 - Backward Slice Path 1. 
 
Figure 21 - Backward Slice Path 2. 
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Obviously, there is another path (path 3) where buf[0] != ‘x’ or ‘y’. However, this 
will not be explored in detail because this path does not modify the buffer. Rather, this 
example will include a detailed walkthrough of both paths 1 and 2. This will most clearly 
demonstrate the capabilities of the backward slice path graph tools. See path 1 as shown in 
Figure 22, and path 2 as shown in Figure 23. 
 




Figure 23 - Backward Slice Path 2 Details. 
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Figure 22 visually describes the components that make up the backward slice for 
path 1. The variable “truefalse” is initialized before main. However, it is later redefined at 
instructions 0x400718 and 0x40071f. Since the buffer is dependent upon this variable, if 
dependencies are incorrectly tracked, buffer resolution will incorrectly report dependencies 
to pre-main initializations. In this path, based on pre-main initialization, the buffer contents 
resolve to “ffff”. Since the target instructions for the backward slice are incomplete, the 
backward slice results will also be incomplete. This raises the question, what is responsible 
for pointing to the buffer and what is responsible for writing to the buffer? The answer to 
the former can be found in the second argument of the write function which is 0x4007a7. 
This holds the memory address of the first byte of the buffer. While adding this target 
instruction to the backward slice generator provides more clarity on actual dependencies, 
it falls short of a complete picture. Further investigation reveals instructions 0x40079b, 
0x400791, 0x400787, and 0x40077d perform memory writes to bytes in the buffer. Adding 
these instructions to the backward slice generator finds all of the dependencies of the 
buffer. Based on post-main initializations, the contents of the buffer still resolve to “ffff”. 




Figure 23 visually describes the components that make up the backward slice for 
path 2. Path 2 is similar to Path 1. Except, the path taken influences the contents of the 
buffer differently. In this path, based on pre-main initialization, the buffer contents resolve 
to “tttt”. Instructions 0x40079b, 0x400791, 0x400787, and 0x40077d perform memory 
writes to bytes in the buffer. Base on post-main initializations, the contents of the buffer 
still resolve to ‘tttt’. Again, as a note, the “truefalse” variable dependence is correctly 
tracked from 0x400718 much like it is from 0x40071f in path 1. 
As stated above, all of the previous analysis is statically done by hand. This level 
of detail in highly desirable but extremely time consuming. The automation of this is the 
apex of this research project. At this point, angr is brought on to ease some of the analysis 
burden. Consequently, this is also where some angr related issues arise, as the built in 
backward slice functionality in angr has some robustness issues, hence the need for this 
project’s body of work. When these issues arise, they are identified and referenced in the 
section below. The first of these challenges is discussed in the section labeled as follows: 
“All Instructions That Modify Buffer Must Be Targets”. See these notes for a detailed 
explanation of the issue.  
By utilizing NetworkX, the results of the backward slice can be used to track 
individual dependencies from the CDG and DDG. Specifically, if a dependence is found 
from an instruction in the backward slice to a given target, an edge is created between their 




The first step is to use angr to generate the CFG and DDG. Use these to determine 
the target dependencies. For each target, search the PDG for any node that provides a 
dependence for the target. As an example, Target x is control dependent upon y so there is 
an edge from y to x. Angr is used to determine what nodes are in the given path and what 
nodes are not in the path. Next the determination of what addresses are and are not in the 
path. The outputs for both paths 1 and 2 are shown below in Figure 24 and in Figure 25. 
 




Figure 25 - Automated Backward Slice Graph Path 2. 
These graphs demonstrate all of the relevant information that can be gleaned from 
both backward slice analysis and program dependency graphs in one simple visual. As a 
result, these graphs clearly articulate the chain of dependency that is responsible for each 
target. Armed with this information, an analyst is able to glean useful information regarding 
the contents of a call of interest. For example, this context would allow for the content of 
network call to be more closely monitored and possibly modified. Some details of the 
process involved in getting to this point are a bit more confusing and nuanced than make 
sense to explain here. See Types of Node and Visually Confusing Nodes and Edge in the 






This section details the how the tools developed for this project can be implemented 
into a malware analysis workflow. It is a blueprint by which an analyst can model 
expectations of what these tools can bring to their reverse engineering efforts. These tools 
are not meant to replace the expertise required to reverse engineer malicious binaries such 
as malware but rather to lessen the time burden and augment the analysts abilities.  
4.2.1 Integration Into Malware Analysis Workflow 
The tools developed for this project have applications in a malware analysis 
workflow in assisting an analyst in better focusing their efforts on functions of the binary 
that are of the most interest. This is enabled by enumerating what blocks are responsible 
for constructing the contents of a particular function call. This requires that an analyst has 
some existing knowledge of the binary.  
Given that an analyst is able to identify the address of a network call, these tools 
are capable of identifying where the analyst should look to understand what information 
the malware is collecting for this call. This information enables analysts to do the 
following: understand what information has been compromised on a particular system, 
reconstruct the command and control messages between a malware installation and its 
operators, and spoof the network call with feasible data to learn more about the malware 







This section details the challenges, roadblocks, and interesting problems faced 
throughout the development of these tools.  
4.3.1 All Instructions That Modify Buffer Must Be Targets 
Because the angr addresses the backward slice, it is not sufficient to simply run the 
backward slice on the desired target, rather it is necessary to first compute all of the 
addresses that modify the buffer and tag those as targets. Some efforts have been made to 
automate this procedure, but this is still an open problem. Additionally, it is necessary to 
run a separate backward slice for each target. Otherwise, it is impossible to differentiate 
which instructions are responsible for bringing which target into the slice. 
4.3.2 Types of Node 
An quark with angr is that the CFG, DDG, and backward slice analysis represent 
nodes slightly differently. Some are referenced by basic block node and some by 
instructions. This is a technicality, and it is mostly straightforward to convert them all to 
the same format. This is handled by cdgGraph.py and ddgGraph.py. For reference, the 
backward slice graph output references by instruction as shown in Figure 24 and Figure 
25. 
4.3.3 Visually Confusing Nodes and Edges 
An artefact left over by the way the backward slices are computed for each path is 
that it is sometimes impossible to tell which target is responsible for a connection. For 
example, if a target in the slice because of a particular node but ends up being a target for 
another backward slice in the same path and they both end up calling each other, it is 
impossible to tell which one is truly responsible. Another oddity that can arise from this 
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approach is a situation where an instruction is shown to be data or control dependent on 
itself. If the situation arises where an instruction of interest is not the starting address of a 
basic block, but is dependent on its basic block starting address, a node can be shown to be 
dependent on itself. Again, this is not an incorrect representation, but can be confusing. 
4.3.4 CFG Optimization Level Issue 
The optimization level for CFG generation can be easily modified. A higher 
optimization level allows temporary variable sharing preventing the need to define and 
redefine variables consistently. However, temporary variable sharing creates inaccurate 
dependencies. For example, instruction B is data dependent upon instruction A because A 
defines temporary variable 15 (t15) that is also used in B. See Figure 26 below. While 
reducing the optimization level disallows temporary variable sharing, there can be 
unintended consequences preventing backward slice generation. Presently, this issue is not 
resolved. Therefore, some nodes may appear dependent upon another when they only share 
temporary variables. 
 




CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This project aims to demonstrate how backward slice analysis of binaries can be 
utilized to characterize the behavior of malicious software. This is accomplished in the 
development of tools that enable analysts to more easily and intuitively include backward 
slice analysis into their workflows. The ultimate purpose of the inclusion of backward slice 
analysis being to allow for the review of functions calls such as a network call.  
To begin, the concept backward slices is clearly defined. This includes definitions, 
posits about when backward slice analysis is useful, and examples demonstrating the type 
of information that can be gleaned from them. Next the tools utilized are discussed. This 
includes a detailed explanation of why Python is chosen to be the primary language 
employed and what packages did the heavy lifting. Additionally, it is explained why docker 
is the obvious choice for making the tools portable. Next a deep dive into the related 
literature is done. This included many papers that employ backward slice analysis well and 
ones that would have benefited greatly from the tools developed for this project. What 
follows is a discussion of some applications of more powerful backward slicing tool sets. 
This includes protocol inference and spoofing network calls.  
All of this set the ground work to demonstrate why backward slice analysis is useful 
in the investigation of malicious binaries. Furthermore, it allows the rest of the paper to 
properly articulate the role that the tools developed in this project can play in making this 
type of analysis more useful. The results of this research demonstrate how these tools can 
be utilized to enhance an analyst’s ability to infer information about the network calls that 
a binary is making. 
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The work presented within this paper works toward automating the process of getting 
useful and human readable information out of backward slice analysis. However, the work 
in this area is far from being over. An automated way to generate targets that may be 
behaving suspiciously and the paths that are of interest would go make great strides toward 
making these tools more user friendly. Additionally, moving away from images as a final 
export of the backward slice analysis and toward an interactive GUI could make ongoing 
analysis much easier and more intuitive. See APPENDIX A. Development environment 





APPENDIX A. DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT SETUP 
Development system consists of a virtualized Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS machine with an 
8 core CPU and 16 gigabytes of ram. Analysis of larger binaries with angr necessitates 
such computing resources. It is not necessary to work on a virtual machine, but Ubuntu 
18.04 is recommended. As per the recommendations of the angr development team, angr 
should be installed in a virtual environment only. However a development environment in 
a docker container for the suite of tools is provided.  
Individual users can decide to use the provided container to construct their own 
Python environment to support future development. Regardless, to access both the 
production and development containers, simply clone the “BackwardSliceTools” repo (git 
clone https://github.gatech.edu/astewart43/BackwardSliceTools.git). For detailed 
instruction on how to use the provided containers, see B.1 Dockerization below. For 
additional information regarding the provided tools and scripts, see the github wiki page.  
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APPENDIX B. DOCKERIZE AND INTEGRATION 
These tools are developed, in part, to support the research of other projects that the 
CyFI lab is involved in. Therefore, they are designed to function as stand-alone tools while 
also integrating seamlessly into larger tools. To that end, all of the tools developed for this 
project are packaged in a stand-alone docker container. This allows any user to utilize the 
functionality of the tools without concern for platform compatibility. Additionally, many 
of our backward slice functionality has been integrated into a binary analysis Engine 





In the interest of enabling the widest use of the tools developed for this project 
possible, a development environment and finished production environment are built into 
containers that are available in the github. With either case, the following steps need to be 
taken to build and run the containers on another system. 
• Install Docker here: https://docs.docker.com/get-started/ 
• Clone https://github.gatech.edu/astewart43/BackwardSliceTools.git to your 
local machine 
• Change directories into “BackwardSliceTools” 
• Change directories into either “ProductionContainers” or 
“DevelopmentContainer” 





B.2 Engine Integration 
A sponsor if this research project is working on a binary analysis tool set project. The 
goal of this project is to develop a suite of binary analysis tools and integrate them all into 
the an Engine. The Engine is a command line interface that enables an analyst to perform 
a multitude of operations on a binary file. To integrate the tools developed for this project 
into the engine, the following need to be done: 
• Make the output a printable dictionary in JSON format that the engine CLI will 
recognize. This is how the engine expects data to be stored for other functions to 
access results. 
• Make the tools developed for this project take in variables from the engine in the 
form of command line arguments. For example, the engine is capable of 
enumerating execution paths through the binary. This information can be used 
while computing the backward slice. 
• Enable the Python script to be callable from a shell script. This is how the engine 
interacts with all its external functionality.  
• Make appropriate edits to the engine’s code to allow the shell script to be called. 
This includes the following:  
o Make a function that calls the shell script, parses the output, prints it for the 
analyst to see, and saves the output in a global variable. 
o Add the command to the engine’s list of known commands and point this 
command to the corresponding function. 
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